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Target Intimacy
Notes on the Convergence of the Militarization
and Marketization of Love in Colombia
by Alexander L. Fattal
This article considers the convergence of militarism and marketing in Colombia and argues that the axis of that
conﬂuence is the drive to appropriate intimacy, a ﬂeeting index of love. I scrutinize this phenomenon in the context of
the Colombianmilitary’s individual demobilization program, which, prior to the peace accord of 2016, worked with the
advertising ﬁrm that managed consumer brands such asMazda and Red Bull. The double meaning of “campaigns” and
“targets,” in the parlance of both generals and executives, was not haphazard but, rather, was doubly focusing on an
effort to lure FARC guerrillas out of the insurgency and transform them into consumer citizens. I analyze how both
consumer marketers and military intelligence ofﬁcers went about their targeted persuasion, each creeping into in-
creasingly personal realms. Situatingmy research in the broader context of the GlobalWar on Terror and the rise of the
global middle classes, I suggest that the fusion of militarism and marketing in Colombia is a harbinger of an affective
mode of governance in the early twenty-ﬁrst century that blurs military and civilian spheres as well as the temporal
distinction between times of peace from times of war.
“You are my child.” This profoundly intimate afﬁrmation is
the tagline for a sophisticated set of public relations/psycho-
logical warfare campaigns against Marxist insurgencies that the
Colombian government outsourced to a leading consumer mar-
keting agency between 2007 and 2015.1 The You Are My Child
campaign of 2013 targeted individuals ﬁghting in the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Army of
National Liberation (ELN), imploring them to abandon the
armed struggle and return to their families. It was the fourth in
a series of ﬁve Christmas campaigns that exploited the holi-
day’s symbolism and its cultural emphasis on family togeth-
erness. The annual Christmas campaigns (2010–2014) were a
joint venture between the Program for Humanitarian Atten-
tion to the Demobilized (PAHD), an agency in the Colombian
Ministry of Defense that is charged with the disarmament and
demobilization of guerrilla ﬁghters, and Lowe/SSP3, a con-
sumer marketing ﬁrm. The slash in the name signals a con-
junction of Lowe & Partners, a London-based transnational
advertising conglomerate, and SSP3, shorthand for the Co-
lombian partners in the local marketing ﬁrm.2 Lowe/SSP3 has
managed brands including Mazda, Red Bull, and SABMiller in
Colombia. Together they peddle images of the good life of con-
sumer citizenship to guerrillas tired of the rigors of rebel life or
demoralized in the insurgency.3
Elsewhere I analyze the curious collaboration between the
PAHD and Lowe/SSP3, the campaigns it has spawned, and the
marketization of counterinsurgency of which those campaigns
are emblematic (Fattal 2018). In my ethnographic research on
the 2011 Christmas campaign Operation Rivers of Light, I show
how these large-scale publicity operations seek to rebrand the
military as a humanitarian actor and buttress the legitimacy of
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3. Portrayals of the good life in the campaigns designed by the PAHD-
Lowe/SSP3 partnership involve scenes such as playing soccer with friends,
hanging out with family during Christmas, and buying cosmetics (lipstick
and moisturizing cream) to feel “like a woman again” (Fattal 2018, epi-
logue). Such representations ignore the economic precarity former com-
batants face once they leave the rebel ranks and as they struggle to adapt to
a harsh economic environment. The breach between image and reality
echoes the work of Lauren Berlant, who writes in Cruel Optimism that
amid fraying fantasies of economic success, “adjustment seems like an
accomplishment” (Berlant 2011:11). Indeed, a certain cruelty festers in the
optimism peddled by the Colombian government’s mass publicity cam-
paigns targeting the demobilized.
1. This article draws on research and analysis from my book Guerrilla
Marketing: Capitalism and Counterinsurgency in Colombia (Fattal 2018),
esp. chap. 3. In this article, all names of people who are not public ﬁgures
have been changed, as have some locations and front numbers.
2. In 2015, 2 years after the primary research for this article concluded,
Lowe & Partners merged with the Mullen Group, creating an even larger
parent agency, the MullenLowe Group, and changing Lowe/SSP3’s name
to MullenLowe SSP3. I use “Lowe/SSP3” here because that is what the
agency was called during my principal ﬁeldwork period, 2011–2013.
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the armed forces (Fattal 2018, chap. 2). Those processes are part
of a wider nation-branding effort in which the government has
sought to transform imaginaries of Colombia from a country
wracked by drugs, guerrillas, and paramilitaries into a postcon-
ﬂict society primed to receive tourists and foreign investment.4
The historic passage of a peace accord with the FARC in
November of 2016 is the capstone of the Colombian state’s
long-running performance of “postconﬂict” status. The peace
agreement formally ended the government’s war with the FARC,
although its implementation has been hobbled by bureaucratic
bungling and a lack of political will.5 The far-right victory of
Iván Duque in the 2018 presidential election is likely to prune
back the peace accord to its barest form.6 Paradoxically, the
performance of postconﬂict status began 12 years before the
accord was signed, during one of the war’s most intense pe-
riods, in the early 2000s, when the government created a series
of bureaucracies to compensate victims; passed transitional
justice laws that established truth-telling forums for perpetra-
tors; and implemented policies to disarm, demobilize, and re-
integrate combatants.7 At the same time that the state created
new agencies to administer postconﬂict policies in the middle
of a war, it contracted a series of experts inmediamanipulation
to naturalize that contradiction and craft a narrative of a na-
tion incrementally surmounting its ills. For example, McCann
Erickson, the iconic Madison Avenue advertising ﬁrm, and
John Rendon, the Pentagon contractor-cum-guru of “infor-
mation warfare,” both began advising the ColombianMinistry
of Defense on its communication strategy at the turn of the
millennium.8
Lowe/SSP3’s demobilization campaigns played an impor-
tant role in this renarration of the nation. The affective on-
slaught of the corporatized propaganda set its sights on cate-
gories as diffuse as the “national mood” (a term that reappears
throughout the ﬁrm’s internal documents), the cultural atmo-
sphere, and international imaginaries of Colombia.9 By giving
primacy to the “structures of feeling” surrounding the military
and the nation (Williams 1977), the men and women at Lowe/
SSP3 who produce these campaigns treat individual guerrillas,
the formal addressees of their campaigns, as straw ﬁgures in a
twenty-ﬁrst-century morality play. In the process, they reduce
a historically dense and dizzyingly complex conﬂict to a tale of
good guys and bad guys—short-circuiting an honest reckon-
ing with the past.
The guerrillas have their own Manichaean narrative of righ-
teous and evil actors, one that justiﬁes their decision to take up
arms in the early 1960s and persist in their armed struggle. The
through lines of the FARC’s side of the story are structural and
historical challenges: the need for land redistribution, elite in-
difference to the peasantry, political exclusion, and state re-
pression. Despite the group’s inability to dedicate signiﬁcant
resources to its propaganda machine—due to the fact that the
Colombian military kept it on the defensive since the early
2000s—the FARC never lost site of the importance of trying to
promulgate a counterhegemonic narrative. During periods of
negotiation (1983–1986, 1999–2002, 2012–2016), the govern-
ment would cede to the FARCminimal political space, allowing
the group’s leadership the opportunity to strategize together.
During negotiations, the FARC would seek to take advantage of
its access to microphones and the possibility of a political
platform. During times of war it produced insurgent media:
radio programs, basic web pages, prorevolutionary music, and
short-form printed materials like pamphlets. Its own propa-
ganda tended either to target local audiences where its fronts
were active or broadcast via internet from exile (mostly in
northern Europe and elsewhere in Latin America, where some
of its militants had settled). Through websites often incorpo-
rated in Scandinavia, FARC sympathizers tried to circumvent
the soft censorship of a corporate media oligopoly in Colom-
bia.10 The guerrillas continually cast themselves as righteous
4. In line with a broader strategy of nation branding, former president
Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–2010) often spoke about transforming Colom-
bia from a land of terrorism to a land of tourism. Andrew Graan deﬁnes
nation branding as “strategic efforts to formulate national identity as a
branded commodity.”Graan posits nation branding as “a newmodality of
neoliberal governance in which the state is imagined as an entrepreneurial
subject” (2013:164–165).
5. The lack of political will behind the accord was dramatically dem-
onstrated on October 2, 2016, when the Colombian people voted the
agreement down by a 0.4% margin in a national plebiscite. The govern-
ment and the FARC then tweaked the agreement and pushed it through
the Colombian Congress. Yet, the Congress failed to pass the laws nec-
essary to activate various parts of the agreement.
6. Only 1 year after the accord, at least 10 FARC fronts have dissident
factions that object with the leadership’s decision and continue their in-
volvement in the illicit economies of drugs, illegal mining, and extortion.
With the electoral success of the Centro Democratico party, which has a
historical afﬁnity with paramilitarism and depends on the charisma of for-
mer president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, such rearmaments are expected to rise.
7. Kimberly Theidon has aptly termed this temporal confusion “pre-
postconﬂict” (2007:66).
8. For a superb documentary about media politics and propaganda in
Colombia, including the Ministry of Defense’s turn toward professional
marketers at the turn of the millennium, see Claudia Gordillo and Bruno
Federico’sApuntando al Corazon (2013). For more on the Latin American
exploits of self-described “information warrior” John J. Rendon, see Rob-
ertson, Riley, and Willis (2016).
9. My use of “affect” in this paper follows the strain of affect theory
emerging from the work of Brian Massumi. Interpreting this thread, Cath-
erine Lutz writes, “the intent is to break down the distinction between the
material and the immaterial” (2017:186). It is precisely this intention to
dissolve the dichotomy between the immaterial and thematerial that draws
me to affect theory, for I have seen how the PAHD’s campaigns generate
both immaterial affects and material effects that are closely linked to each
other. In this way my work echoes that of Adams, Murphy, and Clark
(2009), which, according to Lutz, documents “the rise of regimes of an-
ticipation, which direct emotional energy (especially hope and fear) toward
the future, legitimating a sense of urgency to act today to minimize risk”
(2017:187–188).
10. There has been limited scholarly analysis of the FARC’s own pro-
paganda machine. During the negotiation period (2012–2016), the FARC
created a broadcast television-style news outlet distributed on YouTube. Its
S50 Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19, February 2019
Robin Hood–esque ﬁgures, even as their standards for recruit-
ment and kidnapping fell in the 1990s and 2000s. As a result, the
guerrilla movement swept more and more people into its often
deadly web—as either new recruits (sometimes against their
will) or hostages. The guerrillas’ narrative of themselves as a
moralistic redistributive avenger also contrasted with the reality
that their operations had grown increasingly enmeshedwith the
drug trade and illegal mining.
Reductionist, justiﬁcatory logic—apparent on all sides of
Colombia’s war—is nothing new in the history of propaganda;
rather, it is probably the practice’s deﬁning feature. What is
new is the degree to which the Lowe/SSP3-PAHD alliance
sought to hitchhike on intimacy and love, an intensiﬁcation
that is entangled with an invasive trend in consumer mar-
keting in the digital age. What at ﬁrst appears as a novel con-
ﬂuence is but the latest knot in the two tangled threads of
marketing and militarism. I take as given the idea, demon-
strated by historical accounts of the coevolution of marketing
and warfare in the twentieth century, that marketization and
militarization are deeply interpenetrated (Ewen 1996). Psy-
chological operations and propaganda each have their own
histories that predated the creation of consumer marketing.
What is emergent in the contemporary assemblage of per-
suasion and coercion is the premium on co-opting affective
attachments in ways that scale down to the individual. Whether
microtargeting to the points of psychologically proﬁling indi-
vidual consumers or delineatingminiaturized kill zones around
a suspected terrorist, marketing’s and militarism’s respective
drives to create proﬁt or military advantage require ever more
personal data. This drive to achieve an information advantage
often entails unscrupulous methods with hidden and disturb-
ing consequences.11What I will suggest in the following pages is
that the radical convergence of militarism andmarketing in the
early twenty-ﬁrst century shapes an affective mode of gover-
nance that is already evident in Colombia and is emergent in
other parts of the world.12 The partnership between Lowe/SSP3
and the PAHD in Colombia is a symptomatic response to the
crosscurrents of two global affective trends in the early twenty-
ﬁrst century: simmering fears of an everywhere war and rising
aspirations of the global middle classes.13 I will argue that in-
timacy lies at the crux of the forces of fusion pushingmarketing
and militarism into ever-closer collaboration.
The photograph of soldiers in formation holding posters
from the You Are My Child campaign is instructive (ﬁg. 1).
Employing the ventriloquism that is central to their trade, the
marketers created a disembodied voice—that of a guerrilla
ﬁghter’s mother who calls to her son or daughter to abandon
the insurgency and return home for the Christmas holidays.
Themothers sometimes appear in the photographs that are the
essential element of the campaign. These are personal photo-
graphs, the kind that parents store in shoeboxes and tape into
family albums. One picture features a puffy-cheeked toddler
primly dressed in white. A second picture, of a boy posing in
pants 2 years too big, is washed out in a sepia tone. In a third
photo, grainy and poorly focused, a mother holds an excitable
infant in her arms. From the mother’s gaze, it seems like she
is collaborating to produce a memory with the photographer
(the baby’s father?). The campaign’s full slogan—Before Being
a Guerrilla/You AreMy Child—is printed in block letters atop
the images of guerrillas as children, often toddlers. The posters,
elegant in their simplicity, served as the visual peg for a cam-
paign that ﬂooded Colombia’s television and radio airwaves.
Lowe/SSP3 staged this photograph’s scene of soldiers pinching
their ﬁngers on command for a 2-minute video that it would
use to publicize its campaign.14
Although images and sounds from You Are My Child are
worthy of an article-length semiotic analysis, much of what is
at stake in such soldiery scenes can be examined through the
lens of the biblical parable of the return of the prodigal son
(Cárdenas Sarrias 2005:62–69; Hoyos García 2011:80–83). Co-
lombian anthropologist Juan Felipe Hoyos García writes, “The
moral of the story is not only that the demobilized is a lost son
who is accepted upon his return, but that his return reinforces
the paternal relationship between the State and its subject”
11. For books about the tactics of data capitalism in the early twenty-
ﬁrst century and how it moves business into increasingly private realms,
see Turow (2011) and Einstein (2016).
12. This convergence resonates with academic discussion about the
military-industrial-media-entertainment network, or complex (Der Derian
2001; Stahl 2009). The PAHD strengthens the connective dashes of this
conjunction by bringing the image-based work of advertising into ever-
closer coordination with military operations.
13. Here I am gesturing toward the synthesis of two literatures, one
that tackles the affective regime of the Global War on Terror and another
that considers consumerism, aspiration, and the rise of the global middle
class. I do not have space to synthesize both bodies of work here, but two
emblematic titles are The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect
from the Cold War to the War on Terror (Masco 2014) and The Global
Middle Classes: Theorizing through Ethnography (Heiman, Freeman, and
Liechty 2012).
14. The 2-minute piece serves as online publicity for the campaign
itself and is emblematic of the recursive nature of mass publicity in the
digital age. The marketers take as a given what anthropologist Christopher
Kelty posited about the internet in 2005: that it is best conceived as a
textual contest, in that it is constantly being rewritten (Kelty 2005:185–
186). The staff of Lowe/SSP3 anticipates and shapes how its campaigns will
circulate online after the mass publicity blitz on Colombian television and
radio.
original slogan was “breaking the media siege.” For a detailed parsing of the
FARC’s foray into online news, see Fattal (2017). When the FARC ratiﬁed
the peace accord of 2016, it held its ﬁnal guerrilla conference in the Yarí
Plains in its southern stronghold and opened the event to the media. For an
ethnographic account of that culture industry–like spectacle, see the epi-
logue ofGuerrillaMarketing (Fattal 2018). Luis Trejos has written about the
FARC’s international presence (2013) and its use of the internet (2012) in
an earlier moment. His analysis ﬁnds that FARC-afﬁliated websites such as
ANNCOL pulled together a loose global network of contributors. By doing
so the guerrilla group sought to compensate for its exclusion from the public
sphere at the national level.
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(HoyosGarcía 2011:82). The dozens of campaigns produced by
Lowe/SSP3 for the PAHD bear out Hoyos García’s analysis, but
none so blatantly as You Are My Child. The campaign inter-
polates guerrillas as state subjects while also reactivating the
gendered bonds of kinship. These are bonds that the FARC
and ELN attempt to displace with the ties of camaraderie. (One
former member of the FARC recalled his commander explain-
ing to him and other new recruits that they needed to prepare
themselves psychologically to kill members of their own fam-
ilies if their kin should betray the rebel movement.)
The soldiers in the photograph stand in for fathers pre-
sumed to be missing, metonymically casting the military into a
relationship of proxy intimacy with mothers from the work-
ing classes from which the vast majority of guerrillas are re-
cruited.15 The corporatized propaganda’s appeal to demobilize
is a call to return to the domestic space of amother’s love, while
also resubjecting oneself to the dominion of the father ﬁgure
of the militarized state. The mise en scène taps into a long-
standing gendered allegory of parents’ unconditional love for
their children, silently suffering mothers, and disciplinary but
ultimately forgiving fathers.
The paternal state, however, is always eager to shore up its
tenuous authority. Reading another image from You Are My
Child against the grain, we see the military gluing the cam-
paign’s posters to a humble brick exterior in an impoverished
neighborhood of the southern city of San Vicente de Caguán,
where the FARC maintained an active presence (ﬁg. 2). By
papering over this façade with the posters, the government is
ﬁguratively hiding the ﬁssures opened by the territorial com-
petition between guerrillas, drug lords, paramilitaries, and the
Colombian government (backed by US military support). The
intervention of the PAHD-Lowe/SSP3 partnership is emblem-
atic of a much longer process by which the military gradually
expands into outlaw zones in a bid to project, if not consolidate,
its authority in a sovereign ﬁeld that historians of Colombia
have described as severely fragmented (Bushnell 1993; Safford
and Palacios 2002).16
The way in which the military coordinated its marketized
propagandawith its broadermilitary strategy is noteworthy. The
PAHD, Lowe/SSP3, and regional intelligence services through-
out the country have triangulated to target speciﬁc fronts and
individual combatants from the middle and upper rungs of the
guerrilla hierarchy. These ranking insurgents can provide in-
sights about their superiors; identify stashes of weapons, drugs,
Figure 1. Soldiers hold posters from the Before Being a Guerrilla/You Are My Child campaign. Image courtesy of Ministry of Na-
tional Defense (Colombia).
15. Alternatively, in a Lacanian vein, the image evokes the idea of
“extimacy,” whichWilliamMazzarella paraphrases as the simultaneity and
ambivalence between externality and intimacy (Mazzarella 2017:50), and,
via Durkheim, “a peculiarly intimate anonymity” (Mazzarella 2017:58). The
photographs used in the campaign are clearly intimate yet also “extimate” at
the same time, in that the images are cast into a forced relationshipwith these
anonymous soldiers who display such personal scenes on command.
16. I would take the descriptor of fragmented sovereignty in Colombia
even further. The way that armed groups shift inﬂuence over territory and
through time, in protean processes of demobilization and remobilization,
illuminates a form of sovereignty that I consider to be “kaleidoscopic” in
that the fragments are often in motion and colliding with each other.
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and money; and cut into the guerrillas’ greatest advantage:
knowledge of the terrain. Over the 9 years that I have re-
searched the PAHD, from 2007 to 2016, I have watched its
communications and strategic area unit, which is dedicated to
targeting FARC and ELN leaders, work together in ever-closer
coordination.
In what follows, I look beneath the PAHD’s mass-media
campaigns to take seriously its announced targets, individual
insurgents, and how the military tracks them down. By jux-
taposing the public and clandestine sides of the PAHD, I am
suggesting that the linguistic overlap of “campaigns” and “tar-
gets” in military and marketing parlance is not coincidental.
The double meanings reveal a singular assemblage sharing an
epistemological framework that seeks to manage structures of
visibility and invisibility to maximum advantage. I will zoom
in on the process of targeting, interpreting it as a switch that
connects the counterinsurgency state and the marketing na-
tion in Colombia. The instrumentalization of love is the ulti-
mate target. Both sets of experts—generals and executives—
have come to valorize and appropriate, by any means possible,
intimacy, a ﬂeeting index of love.17 To see how the targeting of
intimacy works in the Colombian context requires ﬁrst parsing
a key term, “individual demobilization,” which in comparative
perspective is not demobilization at all but, rather, desertion
with beneﬁts.
Individual Demobilization
Within the whack-a-mole logic of counterinsurgency in the
early twenty-ﬁrst century, militaries seek to debilitate terror-
ist networks, guerrilla insurgencies, and criminal syndicates by
killing or capturing individuals who play key roles in an or-
ganizational structure. The Colombian military has adopted
and adapted its US patron’s policy of tracking down leaders—
nodes in an enemy network—by all means possible. Between
2008 and August of 2016, when a bilateral cease-ﬁre went into
effect, the Colombian armed forces killed four members of the
FARC’s secretariat, a seven-member body composed of the
group’s top leaders.18 (Previously, the military had not killed a
single secretariat member.) Deserters—framed by the state as
individuals who have “demobilized”—provide crucial human
intelligence in the hunt for guerrilla leaders and in the coun-
terinsurgency more broadly.
In creating the PAHD in 2003, the Colombian government
ﬂoated the signiﬁcation of the word “demobilization” in mar-
keting’s world of noncorrespondences and then ingrained its
new meaning through the repetitive language practices of bu-
reaucracy. The policy innovation was a shift away from the
United Nations’ perspective, which sees a peace agreement as a
necessary precondition for any demobilization process (United
Nations 2006). That was still the norm at the end of the Cold
War in contexts such as Central America, where demobiliza-
tion processes helped steer a transitional period after a peace
Figure 2. A soldier pastes photos for the Before Being a Guerrilla/You Are My Child campaign in Comuna 7 of San Vicente de
Caguán in southern Colombia. Screenshot from “You Are My Son” by MullenLowe Group: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
pqYrofD8F1-k. (A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.)
17. For a fascinating reﬂection on the cultural (re)turn in counter-
insurgency doctrine in the 2000s and how its publicness displaced at-
tention to “kinetic operations,” see Gregory (2008:37–38).
18. In 2011 the government killed Alfonso Cano, the FARC’s top com-
mander. His assassination was the latest blow to the FARC’s leadership. In
March of 2008 the military killed Raul Reyes, the FARC’s spokesman and
then number 2 in a transborder raid in Ecuador. That same month, a sub-
ordinate of secretariat member Iván Ríos killed his boss to claim reward
money (he cut off Ríos’s right hand as proof ). In September 2010, the
Colombian Air Force killed Mono Jojoy, the FARC’s leading military
commander in the southeastern department of Meta. As in the story of
OperationGenuine, microchips with GPS technology provided themilitary
important geolocating information for the aerial assault.
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agreement. When the PAHD began, however, it attempted to
ﬁll the vacuum created by a failed negotiation between the
FARC and the government (1999–2002).19 In making this
move, Colombia transformed demobilization from a mecha-
nism for implementing a peace agreement into a means of de-
bilitating the guerrilla threat. Demobilization became a means
to peace by military paciﬁcation rather than a by-product of
peace forged through political accommodation. Although my
perspective on this instrumentalist redeﬁnition of demobili-
zation is critical, highlighting its hidden consequences on the
social fabric and on the ability to delineate times of peace from
times of war, I readily acknowledge its efﬁcacy in terms of
short-term security.
In 2014 I interviewed Sergio Jaramillo, who served at vari-
ous times as Colombia’s national security adviser and high
commissioner for peace (at times playing both roles simulta-
neously) during most of the administration of Juan Manuel
Santos (2010–2018). We spoke in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
over lunch after he lectured at Harvard University’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government. He described the impact of
the individual demobilization program: “Mono Jojoy [a no-
torious FARC commander] was much more worried about
demobilization than kills in combat. If you kill somebody in an
operation, youmake people angry. If you demobilize someone,
you leave a huge question mark. Where did they go? Why did
they leave? Why are they there, and why am I here?” Jaramillo
went on: “This program opened up the FARC. It allowed us to
understand how the organization thinks—its commanders.”
He described himself as “an addict” of the interviews that state
agents conduct with former rebels. The entire Colombian se-
curity apparatus has become addicted to the information that
former guerrillas provide. Feeding that addiction has meant
that military ofﬁcers surveil, dialogue with, and intervene in
the lives of family members of guerrilla ﬁghters.
The emphasis on family in the PAHD’s corporatized pro-
paganda, evident in the You Are My Child campaign, has an
incognito correspondence in the secretive world of military
intelligence that underlies the PAHD. While mass publicity
operations focus on the ties that bind, the military persuades
individual guerrilla ﬁghters by working through their most
intimate relationships. Military intelligence units sell demo-
bilization to individual guerrilla ﬁghters with customized pitches
that draw on troves of technical and human intelligence that
lead them to the guerrilla’s family member or lover (active or
former). This in turn invites “blowback,” which, as Joseph
Masco has noted, is a response to a previous, classiﬁed action
and a dynamic that leaves the wider public unaware of the
retaliatory logic at work (Masco 2010:450–451). In the Co-
lombian conﬂict, unlike in theGlobalWar onTerror thatMasco
researches, the covert war is not concentrated abroad but,
rather, is an all-too-domestic affair—a situation that has fur-
ther militarized social relations.20
Colombia’s targeted take on demobilization policy mirrors
the high-tech hunt of drone warfare, with similar consequences.
In his book Drone: Remote Control Warfare, Hugh Gusterson
compellingly argues that drones have eviscerated the boundary
between the battleﬁeld and civilian space. Gusterson’s students,
for example, felt that it would be legitimate for Taliban ﬁghters
to come to the United States and kill a drone operator as he
drove to work (Gusterson 2016: loc. 925). Other commentators
have noted how drone pilots must adjust to scenarios where
worlds—military and civilian, combat and domestic—fold in
on each other. Drones are but one piece of a wider story about
late modern warfare’s growing resemblance to premodern war-
fare in its erasure of the military-civilian distinction.21 That
erasure can be separated into two principal strands: the con-
ﬂation of military operations and humanitarian interventions,
and the bleeding, literally and ﬁguratively, of conﬂict and post-
conﬂict moments into each other.22 Colombia’s individual de-
mobilization program sits at the muddled crossroads of these
disintegrating categories, making it an opportune case through
which to refract the more generalized logic of indistinction at
play in cultures of militarism in the early twenty-ﬁrst century.
The 2016 peace agreement, which the government is ﬁtfully
implementing at the time of this writing (mid-2018), is an ef-
fort to revert to the status quo ante, the time before 2003 when
demobilization came after a cessation of hostilities and in-
volved a group’s military structures, as opposed to individual
combatants. But the government’s opportunistic resigniﬁca-
tion of demobilization between 2003 and 2016 cannot be un-
done so easily, for it entailed mobilizing massive amounts of
symbolic capital. To displace the then-dominant notion of dis-
armament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policy,
the Colombian agencies charged with administering DDR pro-
grams hosted elaborate conferences in Caribbean destination
19. The government used the same term, “demobilization,” to describe
its policy for implementing a negotiated accord with its paramilitary ally.
Winifred Tate convincingly argues that the state essentially outsourced
much of the counterinsurgency to the paramilitaries in the 1990s and early
2000s (Tate 2015). For a reckoning with the extremely problematic para-
military demobilization of 2003–2006, see El Centro Nacional de Memoria
Historica (2015) and Romero (2007).
20. I draw attention to my use of “further” above, for it acknowledges
that wars have long been fought on intimate terrain. For an ethnograph-
ically rich reckoning with the residual dynamics of Peru’s civil war with the
Shining Path and how legacies of the conﬂict’s intimate dimensions play
out in a postauthoritarian moment, see Theidon (2012). Similarly, Diane
Nelson tracks the intimate legacies of race, class, and gender across
postconﬂict Guatemala (Nelson 2009). What I am tracing here is an in-
tensiﬁcation rather than a novelty.
21. For an elaborate history of the gradual construction of the military-
civilian divide over the longue durée, see McNeill (1984). Of particular
interest in McNeill’s account is the creation of standing armies in Europe
in the 1600s (124–136).
22. The literature about the convergence of militarism and humani-
tarianism has grown extensively in the last 20 years. It is too extensive to
cover here. The volume edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolﬁ,
Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Human-
itarian Interventions, offers a rich sampling of the subliteratures (2010).
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cities. In 2009 the government organized the International Con-
ference of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in
Cartagena and in 2013 the First Global Disarmament, Demobi-
lization, and Reintegration (DDR) Summit in SantaMarta. These
megaproductions featured delegates from dozens of countries
and subtly peddled the terminological confusion between demo-
bilization and desertion with beneﬁts (legal forgiveness and lim-
ited welfare).23 Afghanistan and Somalia, US client states, have
since embraced the Colombianmodel, and even somemembers
of the United Nations technocracy have backtracked from a
sharp division between desertion and demobilization.24
What is at stake—life itself—is entangled with the seman-
tics. Where the government sees demobilized combatants, the
FARC sees deserters. Any accurate accounting of lives saved
versus lives lost because of the individual demobilization
program is impossible. PAHD ofﬁcials like to claim that each
demobilization of a guerrilla ﬁghter saves three lives: the per-
son who demobilizes, the soldier he might have killed, and
the civilian who could die during their confrontation. While
such a scenario is plausible, and the program has indeed saved
some lives, the government’s framing forecloses the consid-
eration of other all-too-common scenarios: rebels motivated
to ﬂee who get caught and killed, reprisals exacted on family
members of the demobilized, and FARC commanders falsely
accusing their militants of espionage in ﬁts of paranoia. Al-
though the policy has helped the military achieve its goals, and
in some areas improved security, it has come at a high cost to
the social fabric of local communities already torn by the
constitutive ambiguity of guerrilla warfare: who is a civilian,
and who is a member of an armed group. (This confusion is
often mediated by proximity to a militant or informant of one
of the armed actors in a given area, and kinship is often taken
to be synonymous with proximity.) Individual demobilization,
as a policy, nudges former combatants and their families into
the invisible front lines of Colombia’s guerrilla war.
Let us consider the case of Pablo and his sister.
Operation Genuine (Operación Genuino)
I met Nicolás in 2007 when he directed the PAHD’s strategic
area team, which is dedicated to demobilizing senior com-
manders. In 2011, when I returned to Colombia to conduct
long-term ﬁeldwork, Nicolás had ascended to the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel and was directing a Regional Military Intelli-
gence unit, or RIME, in the army. Although a secretary tried to
act as his gatekeeper, subordinates poured through his door
with problems to solve, documents to sign, and breaking in-
telligence to appraise.25 Nicolás reminded me that in the years
when he led the PAHD’s strategic area unit, 2007 and 2008, it
demobilized more guerrillas than in any year before or since
(ACR 2011). Militarized persuasion was still very much his
business, and, as I would learn, his strategy still centered on the
exploitation of guerrilla ﬁghters’ emotional bonds.
I arrived unaware of my good timing. Two weeks earlier,
Nicolás’s RIME had demobilized Pablo, the third in command
of the FARC’s Twelfth Front.26 Nicolás instructed José, a young
intelligence ofﬁcer, to talk me through the PowerPoint pre-
sentation about Operation Genuine. José opened a laptop,
clicked on the ﬁle, and 50 thumbnails populated the left side of
the screen. “We learned they were going to have a meeting of
all of the front commanders from the bloc,” José said. The bloc
in question is the Martín Caballero Bloc, which operated in
Colombia’s northeastern Caribbean region. Militarily, it was
the weakest of the FARC’s seven regional blocs, though ar-
guably its most strategic, since it contained a disproportion-
ate number of the FARC’s top ideologues, propagandists, and
spokespeople. Those big ﬁsh—or, in military lingo, OMAVEs
(the Spanish acronym for Military Targets of High Strategic
Value)—camped on the Venezuelan side of the border. The
RIME learned the benchmarks that the bloc commander had
set for each front commander: how many ambushes, how
many acts of sabotage, and how much extortion.
Blocs cover vast territories, which means that fronts are the
most salient units of command. Three commanders and three
replacements compose a front’s leadership. The front leaders
within theMartín Caballero Bloc are mostly aging veterans. Of
the few young, charismatic front leaders, Pablo stood out.
According to the ﬁle that the military kept on him, Pablo is
purported to have led FARC units that ambushed an army
patrol, blew up railroad tracks and gas pipelines, erected road-
blocks, and kidnapped people for ransom. Like much of the
Martín Caballero Bloc, Pablo retreated toward Venezuela in
2003 when the military intensiﬁed its offensive in the region.27
Nicolás and his team set out to demobilize Pablo. His de-
sertion would deprive the bloc of an emerging leader, de-
23. Colombia has worked to situate itself on an upper-middle rung of
the global hierarchy of security expertise below theUnited States and Israel
(countries from which it contracts consultants) but above other Latin
American nations. This too is part of Colombia’s attempt to renarrate the
nation as a country that has transcended its history of political violence.
Former Colombian generals, e.g., have advised the Mexican security ap-
paratus and received media fanfare in Colombia for their work.
24. For evidence of this backtracking from a clear distinction between
demobilization and desertion at an international level, see Robert Muggah
and Chris O’Donnell, “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration” (2015:2–5). For a more extensive discussion, see the
conclusion of Guerrilla Marketing (Fattal 2018).
25. Nicolás’s rise through the ofﬁcer corps corresponded with reform
in the military in the late 1990s and 2000s, when the Ministry of Defense
set out to create a cadre of counterinsurgency warriors with unblemished
records, so as to avoid endangering the supply of US military aid over
pesky human rights concerns (Tate 2007).
26. Front numbers and other details of no analytical signiﬁcance in
this story have been changed.
27. For a regional history that documents and analyzes the social,
ethnic, and political context of the armed conﬂict in the Sierra Nevada de
Santa Marta mountain range, which is sacred to numerous indigenous
groups, see FUCUDE (2009).
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moralize his subordinates, yield intelligence on the bloc’s lead-
ership, and, perhaps, help demobilize or kill an OMAVE. The
RIME ﬁrst had to determine who would be the best messenger.
Two undercover spies concurred that Pablo’s sister was the
family member closest to Pablo. Nicolás and his team reasoned
that she had direct access to Pablo and that he trusted her.
They gave Pablo’s sister the code name “Abraham” and
began an in-depth study of her life. Posing as market research-
ers for a cable television company, intelligence agents collected
gossip fromAbraham’s neighbors. Curious about thismethod, I
prodded José for more details. The most common ruse, he said,
was to pose as market researchers for cell phone carriers and
begin with questions such as, “Which promotion do you like
more, 10 free minutes, or call for less than 5minutes as much as
you like?” and then shift the conversation. “How do you get
people talking?” I asked. “They’re very chatty,” José said, before
explaining that the undercover agents offer “prizes” as a way to
keep people talking.
José clicked on the next slide in the PowerPoint:
Findings
• Has debts
• Almost lost her job, which pays poorly
• Works 10 hours per day, 6 days a week
• Is easily persuaded by small gifts
• Her mother is very ill
• Abandoned her studies in 9th grade
A slide describing her strengths and the liabilities of contacting
her listed the following:
Strengths
• Suspicious of strangers
• Was part of the FARC
• Comes from a FARC family
• Has a good memory
Liabilities
• In contact with the Martín Caballero Bloc
• From a neighborhood with subversive elements
• Unstable personality
• Undeﬁned politics
Nicolás’s military intelligence unit decided to emphasize her
opportunity to make extra money to pay her debts and help
support her mother. To “win her affection and willingness to
work,” as one subtitle in the PowerPoint read, they sent an
agent to seduce her, or, in the literal translation of the Co-
lombian Spanish, “to conquer her” (conquistarla). When I
asked José if the agent and Abraham had slept together, he
nearly spit out the ice pop he was sucking on. In a mixture of
surprise and embarrassment he said, “I don’t know. What’s
important is the work.” After a pause he answered obliquely,
“In some cases they stay together.” The timeworn tactic of
seduction remains a common tactic.
Throughout 2011, the Twelfth Front lagged in reaching its
goals. By October, technical intelligence suggested that Pablo
was preparing to lead a commission of insurgents into Co-
lombia. In early December of 2011, the agent that Nicolás had
sent to take Abraham dancing and “win her affection” invited
her to lunch. It was “the most important moment of the op-
eration,” according to José. “If his voice quivers, everything is
lost.” The agent slid a folder across the table and said, “Open
it.” Inside were photos: Abraham at work, her son, Pablo. She
initially denied staying in touch with Pablo but later confessed
that they communicated regularly. Visibly distressed, she asked,
“Are you going to kill him?” José paraphrased the agent’s re-
sponse: “No, we want him here like you, free.”
Abraham agreed to help the RIME demobilize her brother.
She would travel to her brother’s camp when he was in Co-
lombia. Christmas festivities provided a stellar opportunity.
She carried whiskey, meat, and other gifts. Unbeknownst to
her, the military hid a tracking device among the presents. On
December 24, she hiked into the temporary camp where Pablo
and his group of 15 rebels were celebrating Christmas. In a
privatemoment, she appealed to her brother to demobilize and
gave him a phone number to call. The next day, December 25,
Abraham left the camp and called the intelligence agent who
had seduced her to report the encounter.
The military, however, is a Hydra, and tactical intelligence
teams working for high mountain anti-guerrilla battalions had
simultaneously located Pablo’s commission. That news fed
back to the general commanding the army’s First Division,
who convened a meeting in which he decided to bomb Pablo’s
commission on December 25. Nicolás claimed that he had
opposed the general’s decision to bomb, hoping Pablo would
demobilize and possibly bring his 15 subordinates with him.
The bombardment killed a female rebel in Pablo’s com-
mission. The rest of the commission scattered and trekked
back to Venezuela in small groups.
On December 26, Abraham called the intelligence agent.
Furious, she screamed into the phone, “You tricked me! You
made me kill my brother!”
At nearly the same time, Pablo called the number his sister
had given him. He wanted to turn himself in.
In a video that is the climax of the PowerPoint, Pablo, il-
luminated only by the night-vision mode of the video camera,
stumbles down the mountainside, whimpering in emotional
overload.
Hoping to ﬁnd other members of Pablo’s commission, José
and other ofﬁcers returned to the site of the bombardment
with Pablo and a megaphone. Only chirping birds responded
to their call. Then an ofﬁcer in the RIME began to dial the cell
phone numbers of members of Pablo’s front. José recreated the
conversation for me:
Ofﬁcer: I’m going to pass you to a friend of yours.
Pablo: What’s going on, compañero?
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Rebel X: What? I thought the military killed you!
Pablo: No, I’m here doing well. You should come
too.
Two members of Pablo’s commission demobilized the fol-
lowing week.
The PowerPoint ends with a video of Pablo eating lunch
with his mother and other family members. Knowing the back-
story does not make the scenes of Pablo’s mother beaming with
joy as she embraces him any less heartwarming. Pablo joined
the FARCat the age of 15 and deserted at 36. Nicolás said, “Look
at that, his mother’s love. He was her lost son.” The paternal
father ﬁgure of the state had dragged this prodigal son, lost to
outlaw worlds, back to his mother’s arms.
When I met Pablo in the RIME’s air-conditioned library, he
wore charcoal-colored jeans, a striped shirt, and large bee-eyed
sunglasses. After explaining my research, I asked if he would
grant me an interview. He asked a few questions, a quick cross-
examination to ensure I was not afﬁliated with the guerrillas,
and removed his sunglasses—a sign that I could proceed. He
described the attack stoically: “They assaulted, shooting and
bombarding. A girl was killed, and I was alone.” In themoment
that Pablo turned himself in, he had visions of his own death
at the hands of the military. What happened, however, was
something else entirely. “They took me to the mall, the beach,
things I never saw before,” Pablo said. “Imagine, I never saw
the ocean, and they were saying, ‘Go in.’ ” At the age of 36,
having lived in the Caribbean region his entire life, Pablo
waded into the ocean and submerged himself in its salty water
for the ﬁrst time. With amazement in his voice, he said, “They
asked me how I was feeling.”
The RIME set out to seduce Pablo, if more ﬁguratively than
it had seduced his sister. It paid for a hearty sancocho soup for
his entire family, let him climb into a helicopter, and gave him
a turkey on December 31. Nicolás acknowledged that his col-
leagues’ treatment of the demobilized is not always so kind. He
contorted his face in mock anger and said, “Come here, you
son of a bitch, give me the information,” to illustrate his point.
For Nicolás, the key to the process is spoiling deserters from
the moment of ﬁrst contact and, in a Machiavellian sense,
caring for the demobilized in a way that exposes them to the
pleasures of consumption. Nicolás boasted that the operation
to demobilize Pablo had been “so effective that he still helps us,
still advises us.”
While working at PAHD headquarters in 2007 and 2008,
Nicolás learned the power of the gift, even if only a cell phone
minute or a cigarette. The seductiveness of gifts and the ex-
ploitation of emotional bonds between guerrillas and their
families are two of three axes of Nicolás’s demobilization strat-
egy. The third is the crass persuasion of cash. Ministerial de-
cree 22 of 2011 is an 18-page price list of what is to be paid to
ex-combatants for collaborating with the government. A .50-
caliber machine gun is rewarded with US$5,550; a dozen cam-
ouﬂaged pants, US$14; helping to demobilize a front leader,
US$27,500. It did not surprise me when José said that the war
college in Bogotá uses Operation Genuine as a case study. The
operation combined age-old tactics of seduction with high-
end GPS tracking devices and a well-calculated mix of threats,
gifts, and cash.
Seven months after Pablo staggered down the mountainside
to turn himself in, Brigadier General Jorge Eliecer Suárez Ortiz,
who commanded the First Division, called a press conference
to boast of the 40 demobilizations in his region that year: 29
from the FARC and 11 from the ELN. At the press conference,
the military arrayed ex-combatants behind its senior leaders
like human trophies (Iguarán 2012). Dressed in white shirts
featuring the PAHD logo, the former guerrillas sat with their
chins tucked to their chests and baseball caps pulled down over
their eyes (ﬁg. 3). The formation refashioned scenes of cap-
tured criminals, conﬁscated weaponry, and seized drugs mar-
shaled for the cameras, a recursive trope (and arguably an
organizing principle) of television news.
With the gaze of the demobilized guerrillas averted, the
PAHD logo—a red heart clasping a white ﬂag—is what pops
out of the frame. The red heart evokes love and the white ﬂag
peace. Written across the white T-shirts is the PAHD’s slogan,
“There’s another life, demobilization is the way out,” which
highlights the individual volition of former combatants to
abandon the insurgency. The question of will implicit in the
slogan raises a series of provocative questions. To what extent
have these prodigal sons returned to their families and to the
state willingly, and to what extent have they been dragged
back? What is the relationship between this image of former
guerrillas arrayed like captured criminals and the photograph
in which soldiers hold posters featuring childhood photo-
graphs of guerrilla ﬁghters stamped with the slogan You Are
My Child? And, crucially, what does it mean to instrument-
alize love to dismember the guerrilla movement from within?
Target Intimacy
As Pablo’s case shows, the ostensibly separate realms of demo-
bilization (persuasion) and combat (coercion) are so thor-
oughly intertwined that they cannot be disentangled. In Op-
eration Genuine we see how the military exploits intimacy,
particularly the bond between Pablo and his sister, to game a
matrix of allegiance, paranoia, emotional bonds, and seduction
to precipitate the desired betrayal. Love, in this instance, is
opportunistic and seeks to subvert Che Guevara’s famous
claim that love of one’s fellow citizens is the spirit of revolu-
tionary praxis.28 In Colombia, the state’s counterrevolutionary
project has operationalized love by constantly poking holes in
28. In a letter to the editor of the Uruguayan weekly Marcha, Che
Guevara wrote, “The true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love.
It is impossible to think of a genuine revolutionary lacking this quality”
(1989 [1965]).
Fattal Target Intimacy S57
the guerrilla’s morale by fanning the embers of family ties left
smoldering beneath the FARC’s efforts to supplant kin rela-
tions with camaraderie. Operation Genuine hinged on Pablo’s
sister’s love for her brother and her intimacy with a covert
agent. Though such sentimental exploitation is nothing new in
the history of warfare, what is interesting is how this move
tracks with Lowe/SSP3’s You Are My Child campaign. What
I want to explore is the convergence between these two re-
spective militarizations of love.
In 2012 I spoke with Juan Pablo, a young, sophisticated ac-
count manager who handles Lowe/SSP3’s business with the
PAHD. He understood the importance of military pressure in
the demobilization process through the theory of the “hierar-
chy of needs” developed byAbrahamMaslow, amid-twentieth-
century American psychologist. Maslow’s tiered system, ex-
traordinarily inﬂuential in consumer marketing, establishes a
pyramid of human needs that, when fulﬁlled, enable what
Maslow called “self-actualization” (1943). The hierarchy goes
from the basic physiological needs of eating, sleeping, and
breathing, at the bottom, to creativity, morality, and problem
solving at the top.29 Juan Pablo explained the division of labor
between soldiers and marketers. The military’s job was to at-
tack the base of the pyramid. “When a helicopter is bombing
every 3 days, your survival is in question. You don’t have food,
it’s always wet, you can’t sleep, you’re sick.” Themarketers saw
their job as intervening on the third level of Maslow’s pyramid,
“love and belonging.” “After we sufﬁciently attacked the base
of the pyramid,” Juan Pablo said, “we jumped and attacked the
third level.” Juan Pablo continued, noting that their Christmas
campaigns were “done with an utterly emotional tone. It was a
way of attacking the heart [of guerrilla ﬁghters].”
This dual appropriation of intimacy in Colombian coun-
terinsurgency correlates closely with a structural transforma-
tion in advanced capitalism, in which the creation of surplus
value is tied to the production and exploitation of consumers’
affective investments in commodities. Here, too, love is the
target. Kevin Roberts, the CEO of the advertising ﬁrm Saatchi
& Saatchi, writes, “Lovemarks . . . represent the next step in
the evolution of brands. Lovemarks are brands that are not
simply respected and trusted, but loved” (Roberts 2004:74).
Anthropologist Robert Foster writes that lovemarks “signal
an emotional connection and attachment to a brand that goes
beyond reason—and forwhich a premiumprice can be charged”
(Foster 2007:708). As anthropologists of consumer culture Wil-
liam Mazzarella (2003, 2010), Robert Foster (2013), Kalman
Applbaum (2003), and Constantine Nakassis (2013), among
others, have shown, marketing channels consumers’ affective
investment back into products. As marketers segment their
targets into smaller niches, this exercise becomes increasingly
invasive. The success or failure of emergent marketing tactics,
as with wars waged principally through human intelligence,
hinge on the ability to operate on increasingly personal levels.
Of course, neither marketers nor generals work with true love
Figure 3. Demobilized guerrillas from FARC and ELN units in the Caribbean region arrayed before the cameras at a 2012 press
conference. Image courtesy of Ministry of National Defense (Colombia). (A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.)
29. For a critique of how Maslow’s theory takes on evolutionary
overtones as it is applied across geographic contexts in the marketing
industry, see Applbaum (2000).
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but, rather, exploit intimacy, critical moments of connection,
and cathexis that might precipitate a decision—like abandon-
ing the guerrilla movement.30
The PAHD’s dual targeting of intimacy is not without its
consequences. Colombia’s demobilization program has be-
come yet another front in the country’s 6-decade-long war,
which—despite the peace accord of 2016—is currently mu-
tating into its next iteration. As with other fronts, death sur-
rounds it. A particularly tragic consequence of the policy is the
way the FARC intimidates and sometimes kills family mem-
bers of former rebels when deserters have successfully ﬂed
the region. Killing a family member is often the only means
available to the insurgency to stanch the ﬂow of critical in-
telligence that the demobilized provide their enemy. In a focus
group organized by Lowe/SSP3 that I attended, one former
guerrilla put it bluntly: “Before, the FARC didn’t mess with the
family. Not anymore.” As the deceptions of war became more
baroque, the demobilized and their kin were pushed into the
conﬂict’s imperceptible frontlines.
In contrast to the United Nations’ vision of demobilization
policy as a means of extricating people from an armed conﬂict,
the intelligence emphasis of Colombia’s individual demobili-
zation program ﬂips combatants to a different side of the war.31
With the covert war hidden from public view, the compas-
sionate, conciliatory, “humanitarian” image of the demobili-
zation program as established in the hypervisible corporatized
propaganda of mass-media campaigns such as You Are My
Child is left unchallenged. Yet the state’s elaborate effort to
game the matrix of what can and what cannot be made visible
falls apart upon listening to the life histories of former guer-
rillas. Consider the case of Sergio. He deserted from the FARC,
as had many of his siblings. Of the dozens of life-history in-
terviews I conducted with former guerrillas, his was perhaps
the darkest. The sheer quantity of deaths in his family on ac-
count of the war was staggering, which ledme to ask howmany
members of his family the FARC had killed.
Sergio: I think it’s been more than 100 relatives
who’ve died at the hands of the guerrilla.
Fattal: In your generation?
Sergio: Yeah, in the generation, and that’s on top
of those who have been killed by the paramil-
itaries. Those who [the FARC] killed sympathized
with them.They say they’re informants, that they’re
twisted just because they stop working with them—
so they shoot them for not helping. They killed
seven of my uncle’s children. [Emphasis added.]
The FARC killed Sergio’s father after the group failed to
assassinate Sergio. In a recurrent dream, his father speaks to
him from a cofﬁn and urges him to be careful.
From the perspective of the Colombian security state, the
deaths in Sergio’s family, due to blowback from the PAHD’s
classiﬁed actions that turn demobilized ﬁghters into infor-
mants, are acceptable collateral damage for a fountain of in-
telligence that the demobilized provide. Between 2003 and
2016, the period from the PAHD’s conception to its de facto
supersession by the peace accord,32 the FARC’s military in-
ﬂuence waned in all but a few regions where the guerrillas
historically served as the de facto authority. The military’s
battleﬁeld success is due, in part, to the way that the individual
demobilization program picks apart entire military structures
from within. After Pablo demobilized, for example, the Twelfth
Front went into receivership of the larger and more cohesive
Fortieth Front. From a counterinsurgency perspective, the mili-
tarization of intimacy has proven effective. This, in turn, has
enabled Colombian ofﬁcers to make the case to their US patrons
that American expenditures in the late 1990s and early 2000s
have paid dividends and that the military is worthy of ongoing
investment (Tate 2015).
The PAHD extends a Latin American tradition of serving as
“empire’s workshop,” a zone where the United States can ex-
periment with strategies and tactics for maintaining its hege-
mony in contexts where the stakes are lower than in the geo-
political ﬂash points of empire such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Iran (Grandin 2006; Priest 2013). In 2007, the Rand Corpo-
ration wrote a report to the US Joint Forces Command titled
Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earn-
ing Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Helmus, Paul,
and Glenn 2007). Although the publication of the US Army’s
counterinsurgency ﬁeld manual a year earlier had been re-
ceived with widespread publicity and controversy, the Rand
report passed almost entirely unnoticed by scholars and jour-
nalists. Its authors write: “Like commercial ﬁrms that must
update unattractive brand identities, so too should the United
States consider updating its military’s brand identity to suit30. The FARC’s statutes make clear that abandoning the movement is
cause for a revolutionary trial (which often leads to execution). Only in
rare cases has the group received deserters back into its ranks.
31. As I show in chap. 4 ofGuerrillaMarketing (Fattal 2018), the logic of
side-switching, implicit in Colombia’s individual demobilization program,
surges to the fore when former combatants’ economic reintegration falters
and they ﬁnd themselves broke and broken by their trial-by-ﬁre induction
into the wiles of savage capitalism in Colombian cities. Narco-paramilitary
groups that control the marginal barrios that ring major cities often recruit
former guerrillas, offering them a way to transcend their abjection through
remobilization.
32. Nonetheless, the PAHD continues into the postaccord moment as
a means of debilitating the National Liberation Army (ELN), a smaller
Guevarist rebel group that has gained strength since the peace accord. I
suspect that the PAHD also helps provide intelligence on dissident FARC
units that do not ascribe to the peace agreement and continue to operate
as local units that are involved with Colombia’s premier illegal econo-
mies: drug trafﬁcking, illegal mining, extortion, and kidnapping.
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current and future operational environments” (Helmus, Paul,
andGlenn 2007:xvi).Whereasmilitary strategists in theUnited
States were theorizing about how to reposition the US mili-
tary’s brand in the mid-2000s, the Colombian military was
doing it. While the US Army was employing social scientists as
part of a cultural (re)turn in counterinsurgency strategy, the
Colombian government was deploying marketers—arguably
the principal culture producers of our age—and receiving fan-
fare as opposed to critical opposition. (Lowe/SSP3 has received
more than 60 industry awards for its work for the Ministry of
Defense.) Working in tandem, the marketers and the military
have militarized intimacy by operating on the cultural ﬁeld and
social structure, respectively.
Now that the Colombian government and the FARC have
signed a peace agreement, the government is intensifying its
diplomatic efforts to persuade other war-torn nations (and the
foreign powers backing elements in those nations) that it has
cracked the formula for ending intractable civil wars (even as
political and criminal violence continue to scar the country). The
claim is falling on receptive ears as the specter of the Cold War
grows in theMiddle East and the GlobalWar on Terror becomes
not only a self-fulﬁlling prophecy but also a self-perpetuating
phenomenon. To complement its fawning piece on Lowe/SSP3’s
work with the Colombian military, CBS’s 60 Minutes uploaded
to its website an interview with producer Alan Goldberg about
his experience making the segment. He concluded by saying,
“Who knows what will happen after our report airs. Maybe
Sokoloff’s [the featured partner of Lowe/SSP3] phone will be
ringing off the hook from other governments looking for a
way to solve their wars” (McCandless 2016). Goldberg is not
wrong to think that the transnational circulation of Colombia’s
brand of nonwar warfare—that is, warfare that masquerades
as a postconﬂict intervention—is poised to reproduce. What
he does not and cannot see are its consequences, how the gov-
ernment’s targeting of intimacy and instrumentalization of love
have contributed to the militarization of sociocultural life.
Colombia’s conﬂation of times of war and times of peace
offers a cautionary tale for the global moment. In this article I
have extended critical scholarship on the tactical dimensions
of the hot peace of the Global War on Terror, pointing to yet
another way in which war and peace comingle without clear
temporal or spatial delineations. In conclusion, I would like
to suggest that the fusion of militarism and marketing in Co-
lombia illuminates the emergence of affective governance in
the expansive, indeterminate zone betweenwar and peace. That
may sound grandiose, but in actuality it is all too personal.
Scholars would do well to pay closer attention to the politics of
targeting and the subtle movements of a variety of crosshairs
into increasingly intimate realms.
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